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CORPORATIONS—LIABILITY FOR SLANDER.—*SAWYER V. NORFOLK & S. R. Co.*, 54 S. E. 793 (NORTH CAROLINA).—*Held*, that a corporation may be liable for slander committed by its agent or employee.

Slander is oral defamation published without legal excuse. Defamation is understood to be a false publication calculated to bring one into disrepute. Publication in a legal sense is when the defamation is put before one or more third persons. *Cooley on Torts*, 225. The rule regarding liability of a corporation for a tort is the same as applies to an individual. *Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church*, 2 Sup. Ct. 719. A corporation can be held liable for slandering another corporation. *Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co.*, 42 Hun. 153. *Contra*. "However, it seems to have been held in many early cases that a corporation could not be liable as it had to act through its agents or officers. *Townshend on Libel and Slander*, 474. The weight of authority now is that "while it is true that a corporation cannot itself speak and therefore cannot itself slander, neither can a corporation itself make false representations and yet a corporation may be liable for false representation of its agents for the same reasons; it may be liable for slander." *Marshall on Corporations*, 311, note 16.

CRIMINAL LAW—WITNESSES—WEIGHT OF TESTIMONY.—*GORDON V. STATE*, 41 SOUTH. 848 (ALA.).—*Held*, that an instruction in a criminal case that the jury should be very "cautious and careful" in weighing the testimony of a child who had testified, was properly refused as invoking the province of the jury.

It is primarily and generally conceded that the charge should be entirely free from intimating any opinion as to the weight of evidence, *Rawles v. State*, 97 Ga. 186; *Andrews v. People*, 60 Ill. 354; and the charge is error if an opinion to the jury is expressed as to the credibility of witnesses. *Commonwealth v. Barry*, 91 Mass. 276; *Ross v. State*, 29 Tex. 499. Likewise in case of a wife, who testified in favor of husband, it is error for the judge to instruct jury that the testimony should be received with "great caution" or evidence "entitled to great weight" or that it should be examined with "peculiar care." *State v. Guyer*, 6 Iowa 263; *Steele v. State*, 83 Ala. 20; *State v. Bernard*, 45 Iowa 234. Whether the evidence is strong or slight is in the province of the jury, *People v. Ah Sing*, 59 California 400; though, in the Federal Courts an expression of opinion by the court as to the weight of evidence is permissible. *Allis v. United States*, 155 W. S. 117. Still the jury as judge of facts rule is occasionally limited by allowing comments on the evidence, so long as such comments do not amount to a direction or advice as to how the jury shall decide the facts to which the evidence relates. *State v. Duffy*, 57 Conn. 525.

CRIMINAL LAW—RIGHTS OF ACCUSED TO BE CONFRONTED BY WITNESS.—*RALPH V. STATE*, 52 S. E. 298 (GA.).—*Held*, that where the accused in a criminal prosecution is deaf, the court should permit the evidence of the witnesses to be communicated to him in some manner. The trial court was not in error for refusing to postpone the trial until an expert typewriter could be obtained to take evidence on the machine as it was given, but the requirements of the Constitution were satisfied by the action of the court in allowing counsel for the accused to write down the testimony as the trial progressed and allowing accused to read it.